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BLAKER'S EX'RX v. N. J. MIDLAND RAILWAY CO.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
DEN BLAKER'S EXECUTRIX v. THE RECEIVERS OF TIE
NEW JERSEY MIDLAND RAILWAY CO.
Negligence by a railroad company does not relieve a person attempting to cross
its track from the duty of exercising ordinary care and prudence.
When a person is killed by collision with a locomotive, if it appears that his
carelessness materially contributed to the disaster, his next of kin have no right
to damages.
A person approaching a railroad crossing is bound to look and listen, and if he
fails to do so and injury ensues, he is without remedy ; or if, using his eyes and
ears he sees or hears an approaching train, and foolishly tries the experiment of
crossing in advance of it and fails, his failure will be esteemed his own fault.

ON petition for a remedy for damages alleged to have been sustained in consequence of death, where death was caused by negligence.
. C. Gilham and Coffey, for petitioner.
C. B. Alexander, of New York, for receivers.
VAN FLEET, Yice-Ohancellor.-The petitioner seeks to recover
damages for the death of her husband. Her claim is made under the
statute giving a remedy to the personal representatives of a person
killed, where death is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default
of another; Rev., p. 294. She charges that the death of her husband was caused by the negligence of the employees of the receivers.
The negligence imputed to them need not be particularized; it may
be admitted to be sufficient to give her a right of action. The
important question is, was not the person killed also guilty of negligence, to such an extent as to deprive his next of kin of any
right to damages? In cases of this class, the court is not at
liberty to measure or compare the faults of the parties to see which
is most faulty, and then compel the most culpable to make compensation to the other. Negligence by one party does not relieve the
other from the duty of exercising ordinary care and prudence. In
this case, it may be conceded that the employees of the receivers
were grossly careless, yet, if it appears that the deceased was also
careless, and his carelessness materially contributed in producing
the collision which resulted in his death, or was the proximate
cause of it, his next of kin have no right to damages: Drake v.
Mount, 4 Yr. 445; Harper v. Bailway Co., 3 Id. 90; Baxter v.
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Troy J- Boston Railroad Co., 41 N. Y. 461; Wilcox v. Rome &
Watertown Railroad Co., Id. 358; Railroad Co. v. Houston, 5
Otto 702.
Mr. Den Blaker, the petitioner's testator; was killed June 12th
1876, while attempting to cross the track of the Midland Railway,
on a public highway, known as Midland Avenue, in the county of
Bergen. The railway at this crossing is built in a cut, which, at
the crossing, is about four feet deep, and increases in depth as it
extends westward, until it reaches a depth of twelve and a half
feet above the top of the rails. The length of the cut from its
western extremity to the crossing, is five hundred and eighty-four
feet. Midland avenue, as it approaches the railway from the north,
is also built in a cut for a distance of one hundred and thirty-five
feet, and descends to the railway, from the point where the descent
begins, at the rate of two and a half feet in every fifty feet. At
a point on Midland Avenue, nine hundred feet north of the crossing, the track of the railway west of the cut can be seen for over
one-fourth of a mile; at a point on the avenue seventy-five feet
north of the centre line of the railway, at the crossing, a person
sitting in an open wagon can see up the cut, westward, one hundred
and sixty feet; at fifty feet distant, he can look up the cut, a distance of two hundred and sixty feet, and at twenty-five feet distant
he can see through the cut. On the day the accident occurred,
Mr. Den Blaker had been at work on some land north of the railway, which he was farming. He lived south of the railway and
had been accustomed to cross it frequently in going to and from
his work. On the day in question, his work had been interrupted
by a rain, and he had started to return home. He was in an open
farm-wagon drawn by two horses. He was seen by an acquaintance
when about four hundred yards north of the railway; he was then
going towards it, on what the witness describes as a jog trot; he
had a blanket over his shoulders and drawn up around his neck,
which he held together in front, with one hand, while he held the
reins with the other. As he passed the witness, he said he had
some work to do and must hurry home. At this point the track
of the railway, west of the cut, is in open view for about one-fourth
of a mile. From this point, the evidence furnishes no information
respecting Mir. Den Blaker's movements or conduct, until his
horses were in the act of stepping upon the railway. Death was
inflicted by an eastward bound train, consisting of two passenger
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cars and a locomotive, running at a speed of twenty-five or thirty
miles an hour. The fireman says, he first saw Mr. Den Blaker
wheD the locomotive was twenty-five or thirty yards from the crossing; that his horses were just stepping on the track on a very slow
walk; that Mr. Den Blaker had a blanket about his shoulders, his
hat down over the side of his face to keep, as he supposes, the
rain out of his ear; his hands were resting on his legs and the reins
were slack. He further says, that Mr. Den Blaker did not raise
his head, nor make any effort to stop or escape, and that he does
not believe that he saw the locomotive at all. Both the fireman
and engineer swear that the bell was rung constantly while they
were passing through the cut, and up to the time of collision. A
passenger on the train and also two persons who were about four
hundred yards north of the crossing, at the time of the disaster,
swear that they did not hear the bell. A moderate wind was blowing from the east, which unquestionably reduced both the velocity
and volume of the sound of the approaching train perceptible at
the crossing.
It is now an established principle of law, almost universally
recognised, that a :person intending to cross a railroad track, is
bound to look and listen for an approaching train before going upon
it, and if he fails to do so, and injury ensues, he is without remedy;
or, if he looks and listens, and sees or hears a train approaching,
and then daringly assumes the hazard of attempting to cross in
advance of it, and fails, he must bear the consequences of his folly.
In a case substantially identical in its facts with the one in hand,
the Supreme Court; of the United States recently said, speaking
by Justice FIELD: "The failure of the engineer to sound the
whistle or ring the bell, if such were the fact, did not relieve the
deceased from the necessity of taking ordinary precautions for his
safety. Negligence of the company's employees in these particulars
was no excuse for negligence on his part. He was bound to look
and listen, before attempting to cross the railroad track, in order
to avoid an approaching train, and not go carelessly into a place of
danger. Had he used his senses, he could not have failed both to
hear and see the train which was coming. If he omitted to use
them, and went thoughtlessly upon the track, he was guilty of
culpable negligence, and so far contributed to his injuries as to
deprive him of any right to complain of others. If, using them,
he saw the train coming, and yet undertook to cross the track
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(instead of waiting for the train to pass), and was injured, the consequences of his mistake and temerity cannot be cast upon the
company. No railroad company can be held liable for a failure of
experiments of that kind. If one chooses, in such a position, to
take risks, he must bear the possible consequences of failure:"
Railroad Co. v. Houston, 5 Otto 702. Precisely similar views
have been repeatedly enunciated by the courts of this state. A
simple reference to the cases is all that need be done. Even a
brief summary of the principle decided in each would seem more
like a labor of display than necessity or utility. Central Railroad
v. Moore, 4 Zab. 831; Runyon v. Central Railroad, 1 Dutch.
558; Telfer v. Northern Railroad,1 Vr. 199; Harper v. Eric
Railway, 3 Id. 88; N. . Railroad and Trans. Co. v. JFe8t, Id.
95; N. J. Express Co. v. Ni.chols, 4 Id. 439; -Drakev. Mount,
Id. 445 ; Central Railroad v. Van Horn, 9 Id. 138 ; -Del.,Lack.
, West. Railroadv. Toffey, Id. 530.
If we test the claim of the petitioner by these rules, it is obvious
it must be rejected. It is plain, the disaster could not have happened had the deceased, in approaching the crossing, exe-cised the
caution which the law requires, and which any person of reasonable
prudence would have exercised in approaching a place of such wellknown danger. So far as appears, his organs of sight and hearing
were perfect, and had he made that use of them which a reasonable
regard for his safety demanded, it would have been impossible for
him not to have both seen and heard the train in time to have
averted a collision. If the statements of the fireman are believed
-and there-is no evidence contradicting them-it is manifest death
was the result of foolhardy heedlessness. The fact that the disaster
happened, tends very strongly, in my judgment, to confirm the
substantial truth of his story. But, in my opinion, scarcely any
rational view of the evidence, as a whole, can be adopted, which
will not fully establish such a complete case of contributory negligence as bars all right to damages.
The relief asked must be denied, and the petition dismissed.
The doctrine laid down in the principal case, as applied to the circumstances,
is generally accepted in this country
with some qualification in the western
states. Where the traveller has an unobstructed view of the track, and nothing has been done by the railroad corn-

pony to confuse his mind or throw him
off his guard, he is bound ,o look and
listen for an approaching train ; and
for an injury received under such circumstances he is without remedy. See
Btaterfield v. Railroad Co., 10 Allen
532; Altyn v. Railroad Co., 105 Mass.
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77; Tdfer v. Railroad Co., 1 Yr. 188;
Wild v. Railroad Co., 29 New York
315; Gonzales v. Railroad Co., 38 Id.
442 ; Gordonv. Railroad Co., 45 Id. 664.
But when the approaching train cannot be seen or heard by reason of obstructions (Davis v. Railroad Co., 47 N.
Y. 400), where the train is running at
an unusual time (Improvement Co. v.
Sead, 5 Otto 61; Railroad Co. v.
Trainor, 33 Mo. 542), or at an extraordinary rate of speed (Railroad Co. v.
Moore, 4 Zabriskie 824), where the
company have removed a flagman, or
disused some accustomed precaution
without notice (Ernst v. Railroad Co.,
39 N. Y. 61), where the agent of the
company directs the traveller to cross
the track (Warren v. Railroad Co., 8
Allen 227), and generally when the
state of facts is complex: Gaynor v.
Railroad Co., 100 Mass. 208; Whedock
v. Railroad Co., 105 Id. 203; in all
these cases it has been held that the
question of contributory negligence was
for the jury, under the instruction that
negligence is a want of that care which
a person of ordinary prudence is presumed to use under the circumstances
to avoid injury: Railroad Co. v. Goddard, 25 Ind. 197' Bridge v. Railroad
Co., 3 M. & W. 244.
There are, however, several decisions
in which a measure of contributory negligence is apparently laid down more
absolute than can be deduced from the
common-law rule. In the Pennsylvania
case of Railroad Co. v. Beale, 73 Penn.
St. 504, it was impossible for the traveller to see or hear the train except from
a space of ten feet "between the bluff
and thowatch-box." There was conflicting testimony whether from this space
the train could be seen or not. At the
trial of the case the judge left it to the
jury to say whether under these circumstances the accident could have been
avoided by stopping, looking and listening ; for, if not, "the law does not demand vain and impossible things." This

was held by the Supreme Court to be
error. "The duty of stopping," says
SHAnSWOOD,
J., "is more manifest
when an approaching train cannot be
seen or heard than where it can. If the
view of a train is unobstructed and no
train is near or heard approaching, it
might, perhaps, be asked, why stop 7 In
such a case there is no danger of collision-none takes place-and the sooner
the traveller is across the track the better. But the fact of collision shows the
necessity there was of stopping; and
therefore in every case of collision the
rule must be an unbending one. If the
traveller cannot see the track by looking out, whether from fog or other
cause, he should get out, and, if necessary, lead his horse and wagon. * * *
There never was a more important
principle settled than that the fact of
the failure to stop immediately before
crossing a railroad track, is not merely
evidence of negligence for the jury, but
negligence per se, and a question for
the court." Two cases were cited by the
court. The first was Railroadv. Coyle,
55 Penn. St. 396. There the plaintiff,
a pedlar, drove on the track in a covered
wagon, with his head muffled in an
overcoat, and without precaution of any
kind. It appeared in evidence that the
track could be seen at intervals along
his route, and up and down for sixteen
feet from the crossing. The court
charged that Coyle should have stopped,
looked and listened; but added that
whether he did or did not do so was for
the jury under the evidence. This instruction was not disapproved of, and
the Supreme Court, while intimating
that a new trial should have been
granted under the evidence, refused to
reverse the judgment. In the second
case cited, Railroad v. Heilman, 49
Penn. St. 60, the track was visible from
some points on the road, and hidden at
others by an intervening bank of earth;
but the smoke-stack could be seen over
the bank. The plaintiff was in a baker's
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drawn against the rain. The trial judge
charged that it was the duty of a traveller to look and listen, and that the failure
to do so was "evidence of neglect ;"
and left the question to the jury. This
was held to be error, as the evidence
was uncontradicted that the plaintiff
never looked at all. " To determine,"
says STRoNo, J., "whether there has
been any negligence, involves two inquiries : first, what would have been
ordinary care under the circumstances ;
and second, whether the conduct of the
person charged with negligence came up
to that standard. In most cases the
standard is variable, and it must be
found by a jury. But when the standard is fixed, where the measure of duty
is defined by the law, entire omission to
perform it is negligence. In such a
case the jury have but one of these
inquiries to make. They have only to
find whether he upon whom the duty
rests has performed it. If he has not,
the law fixes the character of his failure,
and pronounces it negligence." "Not
looking for a coming train is not merely
the imperfect performance of duty; it is

an entire failure of performance. * * *
We think, therefore, that the court
should have instructed the jury that it
was negligence itself, and not merely
evidence of it, from which they might
or might not find it. This would have
left to them to find whether the plaintiff had looked for a train, and if he
had not, whether his neglect to look had
been a contributory cause of the injury
he had received."
It will be perceived that the decision
in Railroadv. Beale, supra, has defined
the traveller's duty more rigidly than
any previous case in Pennsylvania, or
indeed than the law of any other state.
A case can hardly be conceived under
this decision when a traveller run over
by a railway train at a crossing could
recover. The dilemma stated by the
court seems to embrace all circum-
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stances. If the traveller failed to stop,
look and listen, he is negligent ; if he
did stop, he must have seen the approaching train, and his attempt to cross was
foolhardy. So too in 1171d v. Rairoad,
29 N. Y. 315, while the decision was
based on the fact that the traveller had
an abundant opportunity to see the
track, it is added by DENjO, C. J., "A
crossing can rarely, if ever, be so situated as to render it impossible or difficult for a traveller to observe the track
on each side, for a sufficient distance to
determine whether it is safe to proceed.
If such localities exist, they should not
be crossed at all; and it would be
equally imprudent in the company to
tolerate them and in the passenger to use
that crossing. If the case is such as to
require the person wishing to cross to
come near the track to make his observation, that circumstance, so far from
excusing him from the duty of looking
at all, would only render that duty
more imperative." This, however, can
be considered only as a dictum, and so
far as regards the right of the traveller
to use such dangerous crossings, is overruled by Davis v. Railroad, 47 N. Y.
400, where, under circumstances similar
to those of Railroad v. Beale, supra,
it was held that the traveller is bound
to use his eyes and ears while approaching the crossing; but that he is not
required to stop, or if he is with a team,
to get out and leave his vehicle and go
to the track, or to stand up and go upon
the track in that position in order to
obtain a better view. There being conflicting evidence as to whether the plain.
tiff could, by looking and listening,
having seen the train in time, it was
held that this was for the jury, and
that the entering of a nonsuit was
error.
Somewhat similar to this was the
case of Railroad v. Toffe y, 9 Vroom 259,
where the driver stopped and looked
from a point forty feet from the track,

but could see nothing on account of
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intervening honses. The court charged
that his duty was to look and listen
"1as far as practicable. If it be practicable to see up and down the track,
he is bound to look; but if he could
not see, the duty to look is of course
not required of him," and left the
question of negligence to the jury.
This was held to be correct by the
Supreme Court.
The general current of authority
recognises the distinction laid down in
Artz v. Railroad Co., 34 Iowa 161,
where the authorities were reviewed,
and it was held, " 1. That where aperson, knowingly about to cross a railway track, may have an unobstructed
view of the railroad, he cannot recover
though the company be negligent. 2.
But if the view of the railroad be obstructed, or there are complicating circumstances calculated to deceive or
throw a person off his guard, the plaintiff's negligence is a question of fact
for the jury." So in Ernst v. Railroad,
supra, it is said that the traveller is
"bound to use his eyes and ears, so far
See to the
as there is opportunity."
same effect Railroad Co. v. Fitzpatrick,
35 Md. 32. The recent case of Railroad Co. v. White, 6 W. N. C. (Phila.)
516, shows that the practical limitations
the "stop, look and listen" rule are
recognised in Pennsylvania. It may
be noted that the cases collected by Mr.
Biddle in the article in 6 W. N. C. 504,
show that where the defendant's negligence is established, ant the evidence
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence is given only by the defendant's
witnesses, and is not admitted by the
plaintiff, the case must go to the jury,
upon the presumption of law in favor
of the plaintiff that he exercised reasonable catc.
The English cases substantially affirm
the law laid down in Artz v. Railroad,
Co., supra. See Bridge v. Railroad,
Cc., 3 M. & W. 244; Butterfield v.
Forester, 11 East 60.

It may be noted that the phrase " stop,
look and listen" is not generally employed. Most of the cases speak of the
plaintiff's duty to use his senses, to use
his eyes and ears, &c. This difference
in statement is in reality important, for,
so defined, it is equivalent to the duty of
ordinary prudence; while the obligation
to stop, look and listen, when erected
into the "unbending rule" of Railroad
Co. v. Beale, supra, appears to be liable to
transcend that duty. The essential thing
is that the jury, always prone to give
damages against corporations in case of
accident, should be held in check; and
this is sufficiently attained, in all cases
when the evidence is reasonably clear
that the traveller, with full opportunity,
failed to use his faculties before crossing
the track, by the court directing a nonsuit or granting a new trial. But with
this safeguard, the common-law test of
contributory negligence appears to be
sufficient. Has the plaintiff done what
a man of ordinary prudence would do
under the circumstances ? This duty
will vary with every case; and it would
seem rational to recognise the "stop,
look and listen" rule as dependent upon
this broader doctrine, and to be invoked
only when common sense would declare
the traveller negligent. When the view
of an approaching train is so cut off by
natural or artificial obstacles that the
traveller can see nothing until directly
upon the track ; and the engineer omits
to whistle or ring the bell, so that the
driver, within a few feet of the railway,
sees the train bearing down upon him,
it may well be that an attempt to cross
is the best thing to be done under the circumstances. And, apart from this, why
does not the traveller come under tho
protection of the rule that, in circumstances of sudden peril, caused by the
act of the other side, a man is not to be
held to do the absolutely best thing 2
There is a class of cases in which it
is laid down that where the negligence
of the defendant is so great as to indi-
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cate a willingness to inflict injury, then
even want of care on the plaintiff's part
will not prevent recovery : Railroad Co.
v. Adams, 26 Ind. 76; Daley v. Railroad
Co., 26 Conn. 597. Thus it is said that
a man who is injured while walking on
the track can recover, if the engineer saw
him, but refused to slacken speed : Railroad Co. v. Trainor,33 Md. 542. This, in
another form, is the doctrine of proximate negligence.
See Butterfield v.
Forester, supra; Trow v. Railroad Co.,
24 Vt. 487. But a further advance has
been made in some of the Western
states, where it has been held that if

the negligence of the defendant is gross,
and that of the plaintiff slight in comparison, the latter may recover ; although his want of care contributed to
the accident. See the cases collected
in Railroad Co. v. Gretzen, 46 Ill. 83.
See also Railroad Co. v. Hill, 19 I1.
499 ; Railroad Co. v. Sweeney, 52 Ill.
325; Burham v. Railroad Co., 56 Mo.
338. The practical effect of this doctrine is to leave the mixed question of
law and fact entirely to the jury, under
the directions so general as to afford
little guidance.
RiCHARD S. HUNTER.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
TAMZAN TAYLOR v. LEVI S. STOCKWELL.
The regulation of remedies is within the power of the state legislatures, subject
only to the restriction that as to past contracts they shall not be taken away entirely
or so materially lessened as to impair the obligation of the contract itself.
States may exempt property from execution, or enlarge the amount so exempted,
and such exemptions will, within the rule above given, be valid as applied to prior
contracts.
By the law as existing when a debt was incurred, the realty of a husband was
liable to sale upon execution, and the purchaser took the whole of it, subject to the
contingency that if the wife of the debtor survived her husband, she might recover
one-third of the land for her lifetime as dower. A statute was passed restricting
sales upon execution to two-thirds of the land, and providing that upon such a sale
the wife's title to the other third should vest at once as if her husband had then died.
Held, that the statute was valid as against a creditor claiming under a prior contract.
ACTION to recover land.
The following were the material facts
in the cause: In February 1874, Alfred E. Taylor, the husband
of the appellant, owned the land in dispute, which was worth less
than $20,000. At that date, he, with others, executed a promissory
note to the Howe Machine Company for $380. Afterwards, in
September 1875, the payee of the note recovered a judgment
thereon against the makers in the Bartholomew Circuit Court; an
execution was duly issued upon the judgment, by virtue of which
the land in controversy was levied upon and sold by the sheriff, as
the property of said Alfred E. Taylor, and the appellee, Stockwell,
held the sheriff's deed for the property made in pursuance of the
sale.
VOL. XXVII.-72
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The appellant claimed, under the Act of March 11th 1875, 1
Rev. Stat. 1876, p. 554, one-third of the land, and demanded that
it be set off for her. The court below, however, decided against
her, and thereupon she appealed to this court.
The first and second sections of the act referred to, are as follows:
Sect. 1. That in all cases of judicial sales of real property, in
which any married woman has an inchoate interest by virtue of her
marriage, where the inchoate interest is not directed by the judgment to be sold or barred by virtue of such sale, such interest shall
become absolute and vest in the wife in the same manner and to
the same extent as such inchoate interests of married women now
become absolute upon the death of the husband, whenever, by
virtue of said sale, the legal title of the husband in and to such
real property shall become absolute and vested in the purchaser
thereof, his heirs or assigns, subject to the provisions of this act
and not otherwise. That when such inchoate right shall become
vested, under the provisions of this act, such wife shall have the
right to the immediate possession thereof, and may have partition,
upon agreement with the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, or upon
demand, without the payment of rent, have the same set off to her.
Sect. 2. The provisions of this act shall not apply to sales of real
estate upon judgments rendered prior to the taking effect of this
act, nor to any sale of real property of the value of $20,000
and over, nor to the sale of such real property of the aggregate
value of $20,000 and over, except to so much of such real property as shall not exceed in value the sum of $20,000.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WORDEN, J.-It will be seen that the note upon which the judgment was rendered, was executed before the taking effect of the
statute, though the judgment was rendered afterwards.
The statute doubtless, in terms, applies to such case, and entitles
the appellant to one-third of the land, and to immediate partition
thereof, if it be valid, as applied to judgments rendered upon. contracts entered into by the husband bef6re the taking effect thereof.
The appellee claims, and the court below decided, that the statute, as applied to sales on judgments rendered upon the contracts
with the husband, entered into before the taking effect of the act, is
void, as being in conflict with the provision in the federal and state
constitution, forbidding the passage of any law impairing the obli
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gation of contracts: Const. U. S., art. 1, sect. 10; Const. Ind.,
Bill of Rights, sect. 24. The appellant contends, on the other
hand, that the statute is constitutional and valid, as applied to such
case. We have been furnished with able and exhaustive briefs
upon the point by the counsel of the respective parties, which have
greatly facilitated our labors in the examination of the question.
In order to a clear understanding of the question, it may be well
to consider to what extent the creditor could have subjected the
husband's land to the payment of the debt by the law existing at
the time the contract was executed. This will aid us to comprehend more clearly the extent and character of the change made by
the Act of 1875, and to determine the validity of the change as
applied to contracts previously executed.
By the law, as it stood at the date of the contract, the creditor
was entitled to have sold on execution the entire fee in the husband's lands for the payment of the debt. The purchaser, unless
the land was redeemed as provided for, took the fee in the entire
land, subject to the contingency that the wife should survive the
husband, in which event he became divested of the title to onethird thereof in favor of the surviving wife. In the event that the
husband survived the wife, the purchaser retained the fee to the
entire land, and in either event he held the entire land during the
joint lives of the husband and wife.
By the Act of 1875, the interest which the creditor could have
sold on execution, and which the purchaser could acquire under
the sale, was cut down to two-thirds of the land. The other third,
to which the wife had only an inchoate right during coverture, to
become consummate only on the contingency that she should survive her husband, is given immediately to the wife. By the law of
the date of the contract the whole of the land could be sold, subject
only to the wife's interest in one-third thereof contingent upon her
survivorship.
By the law of 1875 only two-thirds of the land can be sold. In
other words, the latter act exempts from sale on execution the third
of the land to which the wife has an inchoate right during the marriage, to become consummate on the death of the husband, leaving
her surviving, and vests her immediately with the consummate
right thereto upon such sale of the other two-thirds.
It is sometimes difficult to determine satisfactorily whether an
enactment merely affects the remedy without impairing the obliga-
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tion of the contract, or whether by affecting the remedy it impairs
that obligation.
The latest exposition of the subject to which our attention has
been called is that contained in the case of Edwards v. Kearzey,
96 U. S. 595. In that case a debt was contracted in North Carolina at a time when only personal property to the value of $50, and
real estate to the value of $500, were exempt from execution.
Afterwards, by the constitution of that state of 1868, personal property to the amount of $500, and a homestead, not exceeding in
value $1000, were exempted from execution. It was held that the
increased exemption was invalid in respect to the prior contract, on
the ground that it impaired the obligation thereof. The opinion
of the court was pronounced by Mr. Justice SWAYNE, who, having
considered the case at length, announced as the conclusion of the
court the following proposition: "The remedy subsisting in a state
when and where the contract is made, and is to be performed, is a
part of its obligation, and any subsequent law of the state which
so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value
of the contract, is forbidden by the constitution, and is therefore
void."
It may be noted that Mr. Justice HARLAN dissented, but the
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD
grounds of his dissent are not stated.
delivered the following opinion, which we regard as valuable, and
which we cannot condense without impairing its force. He said,
"I concur in the judgment in this case upon the ground that the
state law, passed subsequent to the time when the debt was contracted, so changed the nature and extent of the remedy for
enforcing the payment of the same as it existed at the time, as
materially to impair the rights and interests which the complaining
party acquired by virtue of the contract merged in the judgment.
Where an, appropriate remedy exists for the enforcement of the
contract at the time it was made, the state legislature cannot
deprive the party of such remedy, nor can the legislature append
to the right, such restrictions or conditions as to render its exercise
ineffectual or unavailing. State legislatures may change existing
remedies, and substitute others in their place, and if the new
remedy is not unreasonable, will enable the party to enforce his
rights without new and burdensome restrictions; the party is bound
to pursue the new remedy, the rule being, that a state legislature
may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding in relation to
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past contracts as well as those made subsequent to the new reglation.
"Examples where the principle is universally accepted may be
given to confirm the proposition. Statutes for abolition of imprisonment for debt are of that character, as so are statutes requiring
instruments to be recorded, and statutes of limitation.
"All admit that imprisonments for debt may be abolished in
respect to past contracts as well as future; and it is equally well
settled that the time within which a claim.or entry shall be barred
may be shortened, without just complaint from any quarter. Statutes of the kind have often been passed; and it has never been
held that such an alteration in such a statute impaired the obligation of a prior contract, unless the period allowed in the new law
was so short and unreasonable as to amount to a substantial denial
of the remedy to enforce the right: Angell Lim. (6th ed.) sect.
22; Jackson v. Lamylire, 3 Pet. 280.
"Beyond all doubt a state legislature may regulate all such proceedings in its courts at pleasure, subject only to the condition that
the new regulation shall not in any material respect impair the
just rights of any party to a pre-existing contract. Authorities to
that effect are numerous and decisive, and it is equally clear that
a state legislature may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary
implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or certain
articles of universal necessity in household furniture, shall, like
wearing apparel, not be liable to attachment and execution for
simple contract debts.
"Regulations of the description mentioned have always been considered in every civilized community as properly belonging to the
remedy to be exercised or not by every sovereignty, according to its
own views of policy and humanity. Creditors, as well as debtors
know that the power to adopt such regulations resides in every state
to enable it to secure its citizens from unjust, merciless and oppressive litigation, and protect those without other means in their pursuits of labor, which are necessary to the well being and the very
existence of every community. Examples of the kind were well
known and universally approved, both before and since the constitution was adopted, and they are now to be found in the statutes of
every state and territory within the boundaries of the United States;
and it would be monstrous to hold that every time some small
addition was made to such exemptions that the statute making it
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impairs the obligation of every existing contract within the jurisdiction of the state passing the law.
"Mere remedy, it is agreed, may be altered at the will of the
state legislature, if the alteration is not of a character to impair
the obligation of the contract; and it is properly conceded that the
alteration, though it be of the remedy, if it materially impairs
the right of the party to enforce the contract, is equally within the
constitutional inhibition. Difficulty would doubtless attend the
effort to draw a line that would be applicable in all cases between
legitimate alteration of the remedy, and provisions which, in the
form of remedy, impair the right; nor is it necessary to make the
attempt in this case, as the courts of all nations agree, and every
civilized community will concede that laws exempting necessary
wearing apparel, the implements of agriculture owned by the tiller
of the soil, the tools of the mechanic, and certain articles or utensils of a household character, universally recognised as articles or
utensils of necessity, are as much within the competency of a state
legislature as laws regulating the limitation of actions, or laws
abolishing imprisonment for debt: Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How.
311."
Mr. Justice HuN also delivered an opinion in the cause, in which
he said: "I concur, not for the reason that any and every exemption
made after entering into a contract is invalid, but that the amount
here exempted is so large -as seriously to impair the creditor's
remedy for the collection of his debt. I think the law was correctly
announced by Mr. Chief Justice TANEY, in Bronson v. Kinzie, 1
How. 311, when he said: A state 'may, if it thinks proper, direct
that the necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the
mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like
apparel, be not liable to execution on judgments.'
"The principle was laid down with the like accuracy by Judge
DENIo, in Horse v. Groold, 11 N. Y. 281, where he says: ' There is
no universal principle of law that every part of the property of the
debtor is liable to be seized for the payment of a judgment against
him. * * * The question is whether the law, which prevailed
when the contract was made, has been so far changed that there
does not remain a substantial and reasonable mode of enforcing it
in the ordinary and regular course of justice."
It is thus seen that a state legislature may exempt property
from execution, such as implements of agriculture, tools of the
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mechanic, household furniture, &c., without impairing the obligation of contracts previously entered into, within the meaning of
the constitution, or increase the amount of exemption after the
making of a contract without working such results.
This goes upon the principle that the legislature may, in the
pursuit of an enlightened public policy, and on principles of
humanity, reserve to the debtor, as exempt from execution, the
reasonable means of carrying on his business and occupation and a
reasonable amount of the necessaries of life; and that this will not
impair the obligation of previous contracts. The creditor knows
when he lends his credit that the legislature may make such
reasonable exemptions.
Such exemptions are held not to materially impair the obligation
of contracts. In the language of Mr. Justice SWAYNE, in the case
above cited: "It is to be understood that the encroachment thus
denounced must be material. If it be not material, it will be
regarded as of no account."
The difficulty in such cases is to determine when the exemption
is so great as to materially interfere with the remedy of the creditor, and when not. In the North Carolina case it was held that
the exemption was so large as to thus interfere.
In the case of Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119, an act was
passed exempting certain property from execution (the kind or
value of which is not stated in the report of the case), and providing that upon the death of the husband it should descend to the
widow. The law was held to be valid in respect to past contracts.
The court said, among other things: "Laws exempting certain
descriptions of property from liability to be taken in execution for
debt, are founded in a wise and beneficent public policy. The
state has an interest, that no portion of its citizens shall be reduced
to a condition of destitution, so as to be prevented from prosecuting
useful industrial employments, for which they are fitted; and that
families shall not be deprived, by extravagance or misfortune, of
the shelter and comforts necessary to health and activity. Nor is
such legislation usually regarded, even when retrospective in its
character, as obnoxious to constitutional objections. * * * The legislature exercises this power according to its own views of humanity
and sound policy. But it is not without its proper limit, and it
may be abused. Every party is entitled to an adequate and available remedy for the enforcement of his contracts, and any legislation
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which impairs the value and benefit of the contract, though profess.
ing to act upon the remedy, would impair its obligation.
"It is not competent for the legislature, under color of an exemption law, so to obstruct the remedy upon contracts as to render it
nugatory or impracticable. An abuse of the legislative discretion
in this respect, would demand the interposition of the court. We
io not undertake to intimate what would amount to such abuse;
such a question would be one of great delicacy and difficulty."
Afterwards, in the case of Lenly v. Phipps, in the same state,
49 Miss. 790, where at the time of a contract, land not exceeding
one hundred and sixty acres, of a value not exceeding $1500, was
exempt from execution, and afterwards the legislature extended the
exemption to two hundred and forty acres of land, regardless of its
value, which might be worth $10,000 or $20,000, it was decided
that the latter act was void as to the prior contract.
Having thus ascertained, as nearly as may be, the state of the
laws on the constitutional question, we proceed to apply it to the
case before us.
Previous to the Code of 1852, a widow was endowed of the lands
of her deceased husband. By that code dower was abolished;
and
it was provided that one-third of the husband's lands, upon his
decease, should descend to his widow, with a certain qualification as
to amount where there were creditors.
It was also provided that upon the death of the husband, with
the qualification above noticed, the surviving wife should be entitled
to one-third of all the lands of which the husband was seised in
fee-simplp at any time during the marriage, in the conveyance of
which she may not have joined in due form of law. See Statute
of Descents, 1 R. S.1876, p. 408, sect. 16, 17, 27.
It may be observed that in .Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, these enactments were held valid as applied to a marriage existing at the
time the statute took effect; so far as the huiband and wife, and
the heirs or devisees of the husband were concerned we are not
aware that any question has ever been made in this court as to the
validity of the enactment giving the surviving wife one-third of
the land so far as existing creditors of the husband were concerned.
The wife, then, as the law stood, before the act of 1875, had an
inchoate right to one-third of the land of which the husband was
seised in fee-simple, at any time during., the marriage, and this
right became consummate upon the death of the husband, unless she
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had in the meantime joined in the conveyance thereof in due form
of law. This third, in connection with the other two-thirds, might
have been sold on execution against the husband, subject to the
contingency of the wife's survivorship. But by the act of 1875,
this third cannot be sold at all in that manner; and when the other
two-thirds are thus sold, the hitherto inchoate right of the wife
becomes at once consummate.
We are of opinion, in view of the principles and authorities
hereinbefore noticed, that the legislature 'did not transcend its
authority in thus cutting off, to the limited extent mentioned in
the statute, as to the value of the property, the right to sell the
third in which the wife had such inchoate interest. The act is not
in our opinion open to the objection that it impairs the obligation
of contracts. The provision is but a reasonable one for the protection of the wife and family against absolute want and destitution;
and the land thus saved may be as imperatively needed as the farming implements of the farmer, or the tools of the mechanic. The
same public policy and the same principles of humanity that would
protect the one would also protect the other from sale. Then the
remedy of the creditor is not in point of fact materially impaired.
Where lands are sold, subject to the contingent interest of the wife,
they seldom bring more than the value of the two-thirds, because
this is all the purchaser is sure of getting. Before the purchaser
receives his deed, which cannot be within a year after the sale, the
husband may die, and the right of the wife -becomes consummate.
The purchaser seldom enhances his bid in consequence of the
chance of obtaining the title to the third in which the wife has an
inchoate interest, hence the remedy of the creditor is not materially
impaired by withholding that third from sale altogether. And
hence also, much injustice is frequently done, where the purchaser
bids what he safely may as the value of two-thirds, but eventually
obtains title, by his purchase, to the whole, the wife not surviving.
It follows from what has been said, that the court below erred
in holding that the statute was void as to judgments rendered
upon prior contracts.
The judgment below is reversed with costs, and the cause
remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
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Supreme Court of Kansas.
THE STATE v. MARTIN RUTH.
To constitute rape it is not essential that the female shall make the utmost
physical resistance of which she is capable. If, in consequence of threats and
display of force, she submits through fear of death or great personal injury, the
crime is complete.
A certificate of an officer charged with the custody of public records that his
records show a certain fact, is not, in the absence of express statute, competent
evidence of the fact. There should be a certified copy of the records that the court
may see whether the records prove the fact.
A defect in the verification of an information is waived by pleading to the merits
and going to trial.
By statute Ness county was attached to Pawnee county for judicial purposes
until it should be organized. The law in reference to the organization of new
counties provided, that after certain proceedings had been taken, the governor
should appoint commissioners and clerks, and that the county should be organized
from and after the quslification of these officers. On the trial of a party in the
Pawnee County District Court, charged with the commission of an offence in Ness
county, it was objected that the District Court of Pawnee county had no jurisdiction because of the place of the offence. No evidence was offered as to the organization of Ness county, and the District Court overruled the objection : Held, no
error.

Til, defendant was convicted in the District Court of .Pawnee
county, of rape, and thereupon brought his appeal.
I.

B. Johnson, Willard Davis and Z. B. Freeland,for the

state.

Nelson Adams, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BREWER, J.-Several questions are presented in the record. It
is alleged that the information was insufficient for lack of a proper
verification; the verification was defective, but the defect was
waived by the defendant's pleading to the merits and going to trial:
State v. Otey, 7 Kans. 69.
The jurisdiction of the court was challenged. The prosecution
was in the District Court of Pawnee county, and the offence
charged to have been committed in Ness county. By sect. 2, chap.
67, Laws 1874, the county of Ness was until organized attached to
Pawnee county for judicial purposes. On the trial, a certificate of
the secretary of state was offered for the purposes of showing that
Ness county had been duly organized, but the District Court rejected
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the testimony. We see no error in this ruling, for the certificate
was simply a statement that the records of his office showed certain
facts, as "that Ness county was duly organized by proclamation of
the governor on the 23d day of October 1873," and did not purport
to furnish copies of any paper or record. The paper was a certificate of a fact and not a certified copy of any paper of record. And
that such a certificate is not in the absence of express direction of
statute, competent evidence is clear: Bemis v. Becker, 1 Kans.
226 ; Owen v. Boyle, 3 Shepl. 147 ; Englih v. Sprague, 33 Me.
440 ; 1 Greenl. on Ev., sect. 498, and cases cited in note.
Will the court, in the absence of evidence, take judicial notice
of the date of the organization of new counties ? Doubtless the
court takes judicial notice of the fact that in the eastern portion of
the state there are counties duly organized, and with all the machinery of the law and courts in full operation, and that the western portion is composed of unorganized territory, but whether it
will take notice of the time when any particular county passes from
an unorganized to an organized condition is doubtful. Such passage dates not from any proclamation from the governor or from
any action of the executive, but "from and after the qualification
of the officers appointed" by the governor: Laws 1872, p. 244,
sect. 1; Laws 1875, p. 244, sect. 1.
And it can hardly be that the court is to take judicial notice of
the times at which certain officers appointed in a county hithert,
unorganized take the oath of office and give their official bond. It
would seem that this is a question of fact and a subject-matter of
proof. Doubtless, when a District Court is held in a county, it
will be presumed by this court that the county is so organized as to
afford officers and other machinery for the holding of court, and
that the action of the district judge in thus holding court is warranted by the facts as he has found them to exist, and this presumption can only be overthrown by evidence proving the contrary.
It is not necessary in each case to prove that the county has in fact
been organized. Is not the converse of this proposition equally
correct ? The question now before us is not whether this court, in
an original action, is to take judicial notice of the fact that a county
is regularly organized and courts held therein, but whether, when
the District Court is not held in such county, and the court of an
adjoining county, to which, by express statute, the county is
attached for judicial purposes, declines to recognise such county as
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organized, and continues to exercise the jurisdiction it unquestionably once held, this court shall, in proceedings in error, take judicial notice of the fact that the officers had duly qualified, the county
become regularly organized, and that the District Court erred in
not so recognising the fact and holding terms of court therein.
See the case of Wood v. Bartlng, 16 Kans. 109, on this question.
But is it true that the legislature has no power to attach one
organized county to another for judicial purposes? The constitution provides, sect. 5, art. 8, that, "The state shall be divided into
five judicial districts," and in section 18, same article, names the
counties of which such districts were at first to consist. It also
provided by said sect. 5 that the "District Courts should be held at
such times and places as may be provided by law." It does not say
that they shall be held in each county, and though, by sect. 7, a
clerk of the District Court is to be elected in each organized
county, is there any inhibition on the legislatures providing that
the District Court in each district be held at only one place in the
district. Again the number of districts may be increased by law,
but it requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of each
House: sect. 14; and "new or unorganized counties shall, by law,
be attached for judicial purposes to the most convenient judicial
districts: sect. 19. Now, under that, may not the legislature
attach a new though organized county for judicial purposes to any
convenient district or to any county in that district? Such certainly was the understanding of the legislature in the early history
of the state. For the first state legislature attached Clay, Dickinson, Saline and Ottawa counties to the county of Davis; the counties of Washington, Republic and Shirley to the county of Marshall, and so on. See Laws 1861, page 123, sect. 1. Some of
these counties so attached were named in the constitution as named
in the five districts, and others were organized intermediate the sitting the constitutional convention and the admission of the state.
That such contingencies as the creation and organization of new
counties was foreseen and provided for, the constitution itself discloses, and the power to provide for the administration of justice in
them, without creating new districts, was expressly granted. And
the Bill of Rights, as foreseeing the very question here presented,
guarantees to an accused "a speedy public trial by an impartial
jury of the county or district in which the offence is alleged to have
been committed:" Bill of Rights, sect. 10. But it is, perhaps, un-
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necessary to pursue this inquiry further. It does not seem to us
that this court can hold that the District Court erred in exercising
jurisdiction of the case.
The law of the case was fairly presented by the charge of the
court. The court declared that the force necessary to constitute
the crime of rape might be mental or physical force, or both combined, and that if a person by threats or by placing a female in fear
of death, violence or bodily harm, induces her to submit to his desires, and while under this influence, ravishes her, this is as much
a forcible ravishing as if a person by reason of his superior strength
would hold a woman and forcibly ravish her. We understand the
court to simply mean that the act must be committed, either (1) by
physical force against the will of the female, or (2) with her acquiescence procured by threats or violence. On the contrary, the court
was asked to declare that the offence charged could not be committed unless there was the utmost reluctance and the utmost resistance
on the part of the female. The distinction between the two theorie4
is broad and well defined. Under the former, acquiescence induced
by mental terror and fear of violence, supersedes the necessity of
physical resistance. Under the latter there must be actual physical resistance; the female, when assailed, must persist, though she
knows resistance will be vain; she must fight, though she may
believe this course will bring upon her other and greater violence;
she must cry aloud, though she knows no relief is near; she must
arouse her sleeping infant sisters to be witnesses to the outrage,
though she knows they can render her no aid. Under the former,
the force may be either actual or constructive, while under the latter, it must be actual. The weight of reason and authority is with
the view of the court below: Turner v. People, 33 Mich. 363;
Commonwealth v. McDonald, 110 Mass. 405; Wright v. State, 4
Humph. (Tenn.) 194; People v. lJuhring, 59 N. Y. 374; Regina
v. Camplin, 1 Cox 0. C. 220; Roscoe's Cr. Ev., 6th Am. ed.,
806; 1 East P. C.97, 444.
In Roscoe's Cr. Ev., supra, it is said, "It must appear that the
offence was committed without the consent of the woman; but it is
no excuse that she yielded at last to the violence, if her consent was
forced from her by fear of death or by duress." In 2 Bishop's
Criminal Law, sect. 1120, the author says, "Yet wherever there
is a carnal connection, without anything which can be deemed a consent, where there is neither a consent fraudulently procured, nor
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